Bard College

Bard Digital Commons
Senior Projects Spring 2020

Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects

Spring 2020

Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time
Michael Richard O'Donnell
Bard College, mo8383@bard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020
Part of the Finance Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Recommended Citation
O'Donnell, Michael Richard, "Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time" (2020). Senior
Projects Spring 2020. 115.
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2020/115

This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rightsholder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the
work itself. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@bard.edu.

Yield Curve Theories and Their Applications Over Time

Senior Project Submitted to
The Division of Social Studies
of Bard College

by
Michael O’Donnell

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York
May 2020

1

Acknowledgements
I would like to first thank my incredible family for providing me relentless offers of
support, and for the strength they have shown in the event of adversity. They have only
ever wanted the best for me in life, and as a son, is the greatest feeling in the world. I
would also like to thank my advisor for this senior project, Leanne Ussher. Leanne, you
have been nothing but supportive and helpful, often sacrificing extra time in your busy
days to answer small questions and provide feedback. You have been integral in my
confidence to be able to finish this project, and through its ups and down, you have never
given up. I one day hope to be able to help a young person, as you have helped me.

2

Abstract
Introduction
Chapter I: Introduction to Yield Curve Theories and Terminology
1.1 Term Structure of Interest Rates
1.2 Yield Curve Slope
1.3 Role of the Federal Reserve
1.4 The Monetary Policy Tools of the Federal Reserve
1.4.2 Federal Funds Rate
1.4.3 Repurchase Agreements (REPOs)
1.5 Basic Pricing Mechanisms for Debt Securities
1.6 Unbiased Expectations Theory
1.7 Duration Premium Theory
1.8 Market Segmentation Theory

Chapter II: Historical Analysis of Federal Reserve Policy Separated by
Chairmen
2.1 The Decades Preceding the Paul Volcker Era
2.1.2 The 1960’s
2.1.3 The 1970’s
2.2 The Paul Volcker Regime
2.2 Analysis of Volcker Regime
2.2.2 Unbiased Expectations Theory Through the Volcker Era
2.3 The Alan Greenspan Regime and Greenspan’s Conundrum
2.4 Ben Bernanke on the Decrease in the Term Premium
2.5 The Fed’s Narrative vs. Other Theories
2.6 Ben Bernanke, The Financial Crisis (2008), and Credit/Quantitative Easing
2.7 Janet Yellen’s Exit of Credit/Quantitative Easing and Effective Lower Bound
2.8 The Jerome Powell Regime

Conclusion
References

3

Abstract:
This thesis will analyze three theories that can explain the term structure of interest
rates: The Unbiased Expectations Theory, the Duration Premium Theory, and Market
Segmentation Theory. The paper will analyze what factors and expectations drive these
theories, and how the Federal Reserve has shaped monetary policy within the context of
these theories, from Paul A. Volcker to Jerome H. Powell. The paper will also analyze
what narratives set out by the Federal Reserve, and their explanations of the yield
curve/interest rate behavior through speeches delivered by the Fed Chairman and other
Federal Reserve Governors.

Introduction:
This paper will cover three term structure of interest rate theories and how we can
apply them over time to explain the behavior of interest rates. The Unbiased Expectations
Theory, Duration Premium Theory, and Market Segmentation Theory, will be the three
theories analyzed. The ways in which these theories explain the term structure of interest
rates will be discussed as well as how monetary policy can influence the yield curve.
Monetary policy and the Federal Reserve play a key role in this thesis as the narratives of
the Federal Reserve will be analyzed over the timeline of Fed Chairman overtime (Paul A.
Volcker - Jerome H. Powell).
Chapter I will focus on explaining the yield curve, its shape, and why it is

important. In addition, Chapter I will cover the role of the Federal Reserve and why it
plays an important role in determining the term structure of interest rates; the tools that the
Federal Reserve has in order to carry out effective monetary policy are paramount to the
story of how investors anticipate and analyze the yield curve, as the Fed is the main figure
when it comes to interest rates.
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Next, the basics of how fixed income securities are priced will be discussed, as it is
important for how investors value these debt instruments. Lastly, Chapter I will end with
the Unbiased Expectations Theory (UET), the Duration Premium Theory (DPT), and
Market Segmentation Theory (MST). These theories will all be explained in Chapter I, but
will be analyzed and put into context in Chapter II, where we will be able to see how to use
these theories under different Fed Chairman to interpret the term structure of interest rates
under different scenarios for investor expectations.
Moving into Chapter II, focus will shift from the fundamentals of the term structure
of interest rates to a historical analysis of the yield curve under a variety of Federal
Reserve Chairman, ranging from Paul A. Volcker (1979-1987) to Jerome H. Powell
(2018-current). The historical analysis will cover the challenges that have been presented
to each Federal Reserve regime.

1.1 Term Structure of Interest Rates
When we think about interest rates, we must consider them from the perspective of
the lender and the borrower and their expectations, without ignoring the feedback between
the market and the role played by the Federal Reserve policy makers in attempting to
control those expectations. From the perspective of the lender, interest rates provide a
measure of return on the principle being extended to the borrower. If we know this, then
we can say that the interest rate is a method of quantifying a borrower’s riskiness by
lenders. On the other side of a trade, we assume the opposite to be true for the borrower, as
they will seek the lowest interest rate in order to achieve the lowest cost of capital
available. Economists use diagrams displaying interest rates across different terms to
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maturity for a single issuer in an instant of time; this is called a yield curve. Typically the
standard yield curve reports on the rates of United States Treasury bills and bonds. Banks
as well as other lending institutions use the Treasury yield curve as their point of reference
for pricing their own lending rates, such as mortgage rates, business loans, certificates of
deposit, etc.
In terms of the different shapes that yield curve may exhibit at any time, they are
closely tied to the market’s (lenders’ and borrowers’) expectations for future short term
rates. Given this baseline, the “normal yield curve” is a situation in which Treasuries with
longer terms to maturity such as a 10 or 30 year securities have a higher yield than
securities with shorter terms to maturity such as the 3 month or two year. This is
considered a normal yield curve and could be explained by investors demanding a higher
yield on bonds with longer maturities than shorter maturities due to the risk associated with
a longer investment horizon (later on we shall describe this as the duration premium). In
the case of an inverted yield curve, bonds with shorter terms are linked with higher yields
than that of longer term bonds. This occurs despite the positive duration premium, and
could be due to the expectation for the short term rate to fall in the future. Lastly we can
consider a flat yield curve in which the yields of all bonds, both long term and short term,
are similar to each other or almost equal. Interestingly, we shall see that a flat yield curve
infers that the market expects short term interest rates to fall. Beneath is a more in depth
perspective on these shapes of the yield curve - normal, flat, and inverted.
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1.2 Yield Curve Slope
In looking at the figures below (1.1a-1.1c), we can note maturity or more
specifically the length to maturity for each of the different investment products that are
being portrayed on the horizontal axis. On the vertical axis we observe constant maturity
rates, and on the horizontal axis each bonds length of maturity. In a normal situation where
we would be observing an upward sloping yield curve as in the case of figure (1.1.a), we
can see that as we move along left to right we will be recognizing a positive relationship
between maturity and yield. This relationship is an upward sloping yield curve or in other
words a positive correlation between yield and maturity of debt. In the case of a flat yield
curve as seen in figure (1.1.b),

Figure 1.1.a - (Data from Figures 1.1.a-1.1.c provided by h ttps://fred.stlouisfed.org)
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Figure 1.1.b

Figure 1.1.c

we can see that regardless of the length of maturity investors will be looking at the similar
yields. Last is the event of an inverted yield curve or a downward sloping yield curve
represented by figure (1.1.c). In the case of downward sloping yield curves, we are
observing a situation in which products with longer lengths to maturity are offering lower
yields.
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The shape of the yield curve has long been associated with conversations regarding
economic health, impending recessions, among other topics. There are many theories
regarding the power of the yield curve to act as an indicator for future economic
conditions. This paper will focus more on an historical account of the Federal Reserve’s
approach to monetary policy under different chairmen from Paul Volker to Jerome Powell,
so that we can evaluate the ways in which investors have used the Unbiased Expectations
Theory, Duration Premium Theory, and the Market Segmentation Theory in response to
different forms of monetary policies in a variety of economic and financial environments.

1.3 Role of the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve is the Central Bank of the United States and its board serves
the United States federal government while its regional Federal Reserve Banks are private
corporations serving regional banks. The Federal Reserve (the Fed) is best thought of as
an independent institution (although overseen by congress). The Fed has national
responsibilities including but not limited to executing monetary policy, keeping the
financial system stable and efficient, and providing liquidity to markets when necessary.
The latter of the responsibilities of the Fed, providing liquidity to banks, is why the Fed is
traditionally known as the lender of last resort to banks. This traditional role was expanded
following the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-09 as the Federal Reserve became the lender
of last resort to various markets e.g. the commercial paper market. In an emergency
situation the Fed is able to provide significant liquidity to banks or other market
participants. The Fed is able to do this by buying U.S. Treasuries from investors when
bond market liquidity dries up. (Marc Labonte, Congressional Research Service, 2020,
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pg.1 ) When considering the Fed’s responsibility of monetary policy, there are certain
goals which the Fed attempts to achieve when instituting monetary policy; some of these
goals include “maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates.” (Congress Reform Act, Public Law 95-188 95th Congress, 91 STAT. 1387,
November 16, 1977). The Fed targets unemployment and we will see in Chapter II how the
Central Bank and FOMC use monetary policy in order to meet their employment goals,
which are subject to change and informed by current economic conditions. The Federal
Reserve also targets price stability as seen in the case of Alan Greenspan. Currently, the
Fed’s goal for price stability as of 2019-2020, is achieving and maintaining an inflation
rate of roughly 2%; “In 1996, Fed policymakers privately agreed that their target for
inflation was 2 percent, but, at Greenspan’s insistence, they didn’t tell anyone. In 2012, at
the urging of then-Chair Ben Bernanke, the Fed formally and publicly announced that they
were targeting a 2 percent inflation rate” (Summers and Wessel, 2018, pg. 10).

1.4 Monetary Policy Tools of the Fed
When the Federal Reserve is deciding on moving forward with either expansionary
or contractionary monetary policy, the story can be told from the perspective of the Fed’s
balance sheet. Let us first imagine a situation in which the Federal Reserve’s policy aim is
to extend liquidity to the economy and financial markets. The Fed will then consider
employing either Open Market Operations or a change in the Federal funds rate. Open
market operations describes the Fed’s ability to either buy or sell U.S. Treasuries in the
secondary bond markets. The Fed will typically buy or sell U.S. Treasuries or other assets

10

on its balance sheet through repurchase agreements, which will be discussed later in
Chapter I. Repurchase agreements or REPO’s allow the Fed to control the supply of
reserves in the market as well as allow them to achieve Fed Funds rates targets. In addition
to REPOs, the Fed can lend to banking institutions through the discount window

1.4.2 Federal Funds Rate
The Federal funds rate is the FOMC's main policy mechanism. The Federal
Reserve is able to set a target rate for the federal funds markets in which banking
institutions are able to lend to one another. The Federal funds rate is referred to as the
overnight lending rate, because this is that rate in which banks charge other banks for
lending them reserve balances, overnight. There has been a long standing regulation that
requires banking institutions to maintain a certain reserve requirement in an account at the
Fed Reserve deposits held at the Fed by US deposit taking institutions (banks), which
traditionally had a zero rate of return and were treated by banks as having an opportunity
cost. The Fed then started paying interest on required reserves to stabilize the effective Fed
funds rate and stop it from going below a lower bound target floor. Although prior to this
date banking institutions would often operate with an excess of reserves on their balance
sheet; however, banks now earn interest on excess reserves and “the interest rate on excess
reserves (IOER rate) is also determined by the Board and gives the Federal Reserve an
additional tool for the conduct of monetary policy” (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Policy Tools).
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For example, if the minimum reserve requirement for banks were 10% of
depositsand Bank of America (BofA) were to have $500B in deposits on its balance sheet,
with only $45B in reserves; BofA would need to borrow at least $5B in the fed funds
market in order to meet their reserve to deposit ratio requirement of 10%. In the fed funds
market, JP Morgan could be running on an excess of $75B in reserves and decide to extend
$5B in reserves to BofA at the current overnight lending rate. Exchanges such as this
example happen on a daily basis and are large in volume. According to the Chicago
Federal Reserve “changes in the Federal funds rate trigger changes in other short- and
medium-term interest rates, the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar and other asset
prices that influence households' and businesses' spending and investment decisions” (See
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, www.chicagofed.org). This is what makes the Fed
Funds rate the most important rate in the United States and arguably in the world, as it is
the benchmark rate to which credit cards, mortgages, corporate debt, among many more
important rates are pegged to. The Federal Reserve plays an enormous role in the
fluctuations of the yield curve through their usage of monetary policy and the Federal
funds rate. Additionally, the Federal funds rate is thought of as a target rate, which the
Central Bank reserves the right to change eight times over the course of the year depending
on macroeconomic conditions, and can often be informed through forward guidance. The
Federal Reserve has also been known to let the Federal funds rate target become a
tolerance range as in the case of Chairman Paul Volcker.
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1.4.3 Repurchase Agreements (REPOs)
REPOs or repurchase agreements are contracts in which one party, typically a
dealer in U.S. Treasuries will sell investors U.S. Treasuries and then buy them back the
next day. The difference between the price of the sale of the treasuries and the repurchase
of the treasuries from the Fed by the dealer, is the REPO rate (See Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, March 2020). The Federal Reserve uses REPOs as a tool for monetary policy
to regulate and can help meet monetary aggregate target rates. In addition, if the Fed needs
to reduce the supply of reserves, it can engage in a reverse REPO agreement where the
opposite happens with the same agents. In this case the Fed sells bonds to an institution in
exchange for reserves; this temporarily decreases the supply of reserves available for a
brief period of time, until the Fed must repurchase the treasuries the next day (See Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, March 2020). Another noteworthy aspect of REPOs is that the
security that is sold, otherwise thought of as collateral, does not have to be in the form of
U.S. Treasury securities. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York “Securities
eligible as collateral for both overnight and term operations include Treasury, agency debt,
and agency mortgage-backed securities” (See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, March
2020). This makes REPOs a valuable tool for the Fed to adjust and control the money
supply of reserves, in addition to being a critical tool for keeping the Federal funds rate at
target level. Prior to 2008, REPO operations were the most common tool of the Fed when
employing monetary policy.
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1.5 Basic Pricing Mechanisms for Debt Securities
To begin to understand how debt securities of any kind are valued, it is important to
understand what they are made of and how they are priced. For most purposes we can
think of bonds as contracts that entail a series of payments all due at specific dates. The
two entities involved: the lender and the borrower, engage in an IOU where the contract or
legal document lays out the parameters for which the borrower owes the lender and when,
additionally the contract will lay out details as to what should happen to the borrower if the
borrower fails to meet their obligations (Cecchettim and Schoenholtz, 2008, pg. 87). In
fixed income markets, we can observe hundreds if not thousands of different types of
bonds available to investors; moreover there are many different borrowers available
offering all different types of debt products. Out of the many different varieties of bonds,
the most common type is the coupon bond. These can be structured in different ways,
especially depending on the length of maturity, however they are mostly laid out in a series
of payments from the borrower to the lender and typically pay back principle at the end of
the contract along with a final coupon payment. The amount of the payments are simply
called coupon payments, and these payments may occur as frequently as daily, weekly,
monthly, or annually. Coupon payments are often described as coupon rates which refer to
the total annual payments as a percentage of the face value of the bond .
In order to add color to the valuation methods of debt securities, we can consider
the following equations. As an example we can think about a bond, where we are
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attempting to calculate the value of the principal payment. We would do this by using the
equation given by Cecchetti and Schoenholtz:

PV =

FV
(1+i) nt

(1.1)

where PV is the present value of bond, FV is face value, n i s the time to maturity, t is the
period of coupon payment per annum, and i is the interest rate per period
This is also the basic equation for pricing securities, under the assumption that the
instrument returns a single payment at the end of maturity, otherwise known as a
zero-coupon bond. Although this can be helpful in the case of valuing a specific one
payment zero-coupon bond, we know that this is not always the case. In practice most
securities return multiple payments at multiple future dates. In order to put a value on these
types of financial instruments we must know the amounts and dates of these payments.
Once we have this information we can understand the value of the security by a summation
of all future payments discounted back to the present (Mishkin, Frederic S. The Economics
of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets pg 66).

PV = [

CF
(1+i)

+

CF
(1+i)2

+

CF
(1+i)3

+ ...

CF
(1+i)n

+

FV
] (1.2)
(1+i)n

(1.2) Mishkin, Frederic S. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets pg 66

PV=Present Value, CF=Cash Flow, i=Interest Rate, n=Years to Maturity Date.
Where the present value (PV) of these future cash flows (CF), or future payments is what
we use in order to derive the total value of the asset. In addition to this valuation of the
complete life of a debt security, investors find this equation useful when trying to put a
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valuation on the remaining life of a security. From a financial engineering perspective,
investors can also find value in segmenting existing debt products by payment periods,
therefore creating an entirely new group of products. For example, the holder of a 1 year
bond that provides payments every month, could divide the preexisting bond into 12
different cash flows; the monthly payments on the previous 1 year bond would now
become the ending payment for the new holder of one of the 12 products. To further the
example, if the investor were to segment said 1 year bond and sell the 10th month payment
to a trader at UBS Securities at the beginning of the life of the 1 year bond, the investor
would sell this product at the present value of the 10th month payment, and on the 10th
month or the maturity of this new product, the trader at UBS Securities would receive that
payment. This kind of trade is especially helpful for those who are only looking to hold
securities with a certain investment horizon, and can always be done as long as there is
ample liquidity in bond markets, which is typically always true.

1.6 Unbiased Expectations Theory
Unbiased Expectations Theory (UET) attempts to predict what short term interest
rates will be in the future based on current long term rates. UET suggests that a long term
bond rate would equal the geometric average of current and future short term rates
covering the same investment period. For example, UET suggests that the yield on a three
year U.S. Treasury bond is equal to the combined yield of owning three consecutive 1 year
U.S Treasuries. Additionally, UET infers that the yield curve slope depends on the
expected future path of short term rates (Mishkin, 2004, pg. 129-130). The theory is
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grounded in the arbitrage-free notion that an investor should realize identical gains on
purchasing, for example, two consecutive one year treasury bonds or a two year treasury
bond today, and therefore should be able to calculate the future one year rate, one year
from now. “The expectations hypothesis implies that yields on short-term bonds will be
more volatile than yields on long-term bonds. Because long-term interest rates are
averages of a sequence of expected future short-term rates, if the current 3-month interest
rate moves, it will have only a small impact on the 10-year interest rate” (Stephen,
Cecchettim, 2016, pg. 177). The unbiased expectation theory is therefore useful for
explaining the shape of the yield curve.
For example, when we are considering a positively sloping or normal yield curve,
then we would assume that investors expect higher short term rates in the future. This
would also suggest that investors are expecting a strong economy in the future.
Conversely, if we were to consider a downward or inverted yield curve, this would convey
the message that investors are predicting lower short term rates in the future. This would
also indicate that investors are pessimistic about the economy in the future. The reason for
the relationship between the short and long end of the yield curve being indicative of future
economic conditions has to do with investors expectations about how the Fed will change
rates. To go further into this, we must understand that the Fed lowering rates is a signal to
investors that the economy might not be at full steam and could stand to gain from lower
rates. On the other hand, if the Fed were to decide that a rate increase is suitable, this
would signal to investors that the Fed views the economy as strong and could stand to
benefit from a health standpoint, from a bit of deceleration in growth due to higher rates.
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Going back to the yield curve, the long end of the curve (i.e. maturities of 10+ years) will
be dependent on the outlook of economic health per the view of investors. In the case of an
inverted or downward sloping yield curve we can see how pessimistic investor behavior is
able to pull yields down on the long end of the curve, as a response to the Fed lowering
Fed Funds Rates. It is this relationship between the Fed and their ability to change
overnight rates with investors who are taking Fed action as signals for economic health,
which makes controlling the shape of the yield curve so difficult for the Fed; a major
question is whether or not the Fed is able to effectively control the term structure of
interest rates.
According to this theory, the shape of the yield curve is not only a gauge of future
economic conditions but also an indication to investors of future short term rates. In the
case that we see a normal yield curve, UET suggests that because the curve is upward
sloping, future short term rates are expected to rise. When considering a flat yield curve,
future short term rates are expected to remain similar or the same. Lastly when there is an
inverted or downward sloping yield curve, the expectation according to UET is that future
short term rates are going to decline. In financial markets, this theory is often used as an
‘arbitrage theory’ in which investors are able to lock in forward rates for short term debt
instruments in futures markets based on their analysis of what future short term rates may
look like based on the slope of the yield curve. One of the most notable investment
strategies stemming from the UET is the rollover strategy, involving analyzing futures
rates in order to predict or lock in rates. “The expectations hypothesis tells us that
long-term bond yields are all averages of expected future short-term yields—the same set
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of short-term interest rates— so interest rates of different maturities will move together”
(Stephen, Cecchettim, 2016, pg. 176).

(1 + 0 rn )n = [(1 + 0 r1 )(1 +

1 f 1 )(1

+

2 f 1)

. . . (1 +

t+(n−1) f 1 )]

(1.3)

(1.3) Describes a rollover strategy equation in which we should be able to, under the UET,
calculate for future short-term interest rates given the long-term rates. Where n=Years to
Maturity, r=Interest Rate, and t=Years Forward From Today, and f=Forward/Future
Rate.
Ideally, there should be no arbitrage opportunity given the assumption of the
efficient markets hypothesis, so in the case of fixed income securities of different
maturities an investor should be able to equate for example a two-year loan contracted
today payable in two year with a one-year loan contracted today and payable this year and
a one-year loan contracted next year, payable in two years. In the case of efficient markets,
we should observe no opportunity for investors to make any profits from choosing between
the two investment strategies. However, in the real world forward rates and expected future
spot rates are often utilized in order to produce a profit for investors.

1.7 Duration Premium Theory
In its most natural form, the duration premium can be thought of as a premium on
an asset that investors demand in cases where the given asset is considered to have poor
liquidity. The higher the duration premium is for a given asset, the more risky the asset is
deemed to be. Stephen and Cecchettim state that “long-term interest rates are typically
higher than short-term interest rates because long-term bonds are riskier than short-term
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bonds. Bondholders face both inflation and interest rate risk. The longer the term of the
bond, the greater both types of risk. (Stephen, Cecchettim, 2016, pg. 177). Additional risk
is taken on in the form of liquidity; if investors are locked into a bond with a longer term to
maturity, then they would be foregoing liquidity, this is an additional reason why investors
demand a premium for duration. Volatility in interest rates in terms of debt securities is a
higher risk for longer term maturities. This is called duration or price elasticity to a change
in interest rates. To compensate investors for investing longer term there is a higher
interest premium. In addition to both liquidity and interest rate volatility risk, investments
with longer time horizons are also subject to inflation risk. When we think of the liquidity
premium in terms of the yield curve, and were to be observing an upward sloping yield
curve, we would be able to recognize a liquidity premium between 3-month Treasury
bonds and 30-years. Liquidity premium would suggest that the higher yield of the 30-year
as compared to the 3-month bond would be due to the longer investment horizon of the
30-year bond, as long term investments demand a higher rate of return compared to short
term investments. The Duration Premium Theory can also be thought of as similar to the
expectation theory, however the assumption that all bonds can be considered perfect
substitutes is not carried over to the Duration Premium Theory. When considering the
increase of a premium on securities due to an increase in their maturity or investment
horizon, we can make sense out of why this would contribute to an upward sloping yield
curve.
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1.8 Market Segmentation Theory
Market segmentation theory poses the notion that both investors and lenders have
preferences for maturity that they maintain in fixed income markets. MST also differs
greatly from the UET, in that bonds of different maturities cannot act as perfect substitutes
for each other. Mishkin says that “the key assumption in the SMT is that bonds of different
maturities are not substitutes at all, so the expected return from holding a bond of one
matrity has no effect on the demand for a bond of another maturity” (Mishkin, 2004, pg.
132). The result of different preferences in fixed income markets, therefore create a variety
of smaller markets which all have their own supply and demand forces, which dictate
unique equilibriums for each submarket. In understanding this, market segmentation theory
is suggesting that we should not be analyzing the yield curve as a whole. In contrast to
analyzing the entire yield curve, we should be looking at the yield curve in segments: short
term, mid-term, and long-term bonds. For example, in the corporate bond market, we could
more vividly see how the demand and supply of debt securities would have its own
independent forces dependent on term maturity. On the short end of the corporate bond
yield curve, the supply of commercial paper would be dependent on a variety of balance
sheet factors such as inventories or accounts payable. Demand for short term bonds would
be dependent on the demand of investors and their appetite for short term investments for
their excess cash. This market equilibrium for short term bonds between investors and
corporations is what will determine short term interest rates on short-term bonds. This is
how market segmentation theory would suggest that mid-term and long-term bonds operate
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as well; as the supply for mid-term and long-term bonds may be determined by
corporations need for mid-term or long-term financing options (property, plant, and
equipment, acquisitions), and the demand for such mid-term or long-term bonds coming
from the demand of investors who may need to add longer-term income to their portfolios
for a variety of reasons. It’s clear that the defining factor of market segmentation theory is
that within the yield curve, markets function independently. Under this assumption, there is
little to no correlation between the rates given in the short-term through the long-term, and
neither rates are affected by each other. The assumption of independent markets is based
on the notion that investors and lenders are engaging in a specific maturity based on their
need to meet and match their own assets and liabilities; Johnson, Zuber and Gandar, state
that “MST is the idea of unique or independent markets. According to MST, the short-term
bond market is unaffected by rates determined in the intermediate or long-term markets,
and vice versa. This independence assumption is based on the premise that investors and
borrowers have a strong need to match the maturities of their assets and liabilities”.
(Johnson, Zuber, Gandar, 2010, pg. 6-7).

2.1. The Decades Preceding the Paul Volcker Era:
The story of Paul A. Volcker, the chairmen of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to
1987, is hallmarked by his successes in overcoming the challenges of a decade of high and
volatile inflation in the 1980’s. Volcker previously served as a Senior U.S. Treasury
official throughout the 1960’s up until his role as Fed Chairman in 1979. During his time
with the U.S. Treasury, Volcker was involved and familiar with the inflationary challenges
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in the United States. The 1960’s and 1970’s were a time defined by multiple economic
expansions and contractions, with a variety of exogenous and endogenous economic
shocks, that would help prepare Volcker for the challenges that he would eventually face
as Chairman of the Federal Reserve (see Federal Reserve History, Paul Volcker).

2.1.2 The 1960’s
The mid 1960’s marked the beginning of the United States battle with high
inflation; a byproduct of high oil prices, fiscal policies, war, and unemployment, among
other causes, especially apparent in the 1970’s. The years 1965 to roughly 1984 were
characterized as The Great Inflation, which was not only an economic event but also a
politically driven issue (Meltzer 2005, pg.145). Over this course of time, there were a
multitude of global events and pressures from different administrations that proposed a
series of challenges to the Federal Reserve from a monetary policy standpoint. As will be
seen, the Federal Reserve during this period, would mainly fail in its ability to act as an
independent entity of the White House Administrations, would not be able to curb inflation
in a precautionary manner, and would continue to allow high inflation to remain as a
component in the economy. In November of 1956, the change in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) was roughly 3% (data from fred.stlouisfed.org), a relatively high and concerning
number as viewed by the Fed.
Following a recession in 1957-1958, Federal Reserve Chairman McChesney Martin
would struggle with monetary growth. Admitting that he did not understand the money
supply, Martin dismissed monetary growth, however other Governors urged for a control
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over monetary growth unless it would negatively affect unemployment. For example
“Governor Sherman Maisel, at the Board from 1965 to 1972 . . . urged a policy of
controlling money growth. He was not, however, willing to control inflation if it required
more than a modest increase in the unemployment rate” (Meltzer, 2005 pg.150). The
disinterest from the Fed in finding a better balance between inflation and unemployment
stemmed from a post-WWII era in which Kenyesian policies were deployed to prevent
another 1930’s level of unemployment (Michael Bryan, 2013).
The Phillips Curve was a theoretical model of the relationship between
unemployment and inflation, a relationship which the Federal Reserve believed that they
could actively manage and control in order to achieve desirable levels of unemployment.
Milton Friedman found that it would be the case in which market participants would
predict inflation based on the Phillips Curve, causing a cycle in which this anticipation
would shift the curve upwards, leading to continued inflation in order to sustain optimal
levels of unemployment. Friedman’s critique would differentiate the Phillips Curve
between the long run, and the short run as he would write “there is always a temporary
trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there is no permanent trade-off. The
temporary trade-off comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated inflation,
which generally means, from a rising rate of inflation” (Milton Friedman, Friedman:
Monetary Policy, pg 11.). Friedman points out the flaws in the Phillips Curve’s original
assumption that the curve maintained a constant trade-off between unemployment and
inflation, where he argues that the curve exhibits a temporary trade-off.
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Milton Friedman's work on the phillips curve and the relationship between inflation
and unemployment is especially important in understanding why this period was ravaged
by constantly growing inflation. In order to achieve the targeted low levels of
unemployment, especially levels falling below the natural rate, the economy would be
subject not only to high inflation, but to a constantly rising level of inflation; “Milton
Friedman, first argued in the late 1960s that any tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment would exist only in the short run; once the public expected higher inflation
in the future, the effect would disappear. Thus, expansionary monetary policy leads to
more inflation rather than a decline in the unemployment rate” (Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, 2011).
By this time the U.S. economy was operating at an inflation rate around 3.4%
during 1966, and 3.7% at its highest in October of that year. In order to combat the concern
of inflation and the speed at which the economy was expanding, the Fed had made the
decision to tighten credit for a short time (6 months); this would lead the economy to
experience deceleration in growth, but allow inflation to fall to 2.78% by the end of 1967,
and help to avoid a recession. Following the second quarter of 1967, economic growth had
begun to re-accelerate; this, coupled with the economic consequences of the United State’s
conflict in Vietnam, quickly spiked inflation to 4.7% by 1968 and 6.2% by 1969. (Mussa
2005, )

25

2.1.3 The 1970’s
The story of global conflicts would continue through 1973 as inflation would hit
8.7%, and then to 12.3% in 1974; this was largely attributed to a rise in oil prices following
the Arab Israeli conflict in 1973. The Fed’s actions in response to the dramatic spike in
inflation was to revert to monetary policy in the form of increasing the Federal funds rate.
By increasing the Federal funds rate, in addition to rising energy prices, contributed to a
peak in economic expansion, which led to a sharp decrease in economic conditions and
more specifically a decreased U.S. inflation rate. The mid 1950’s through the mid to late
1970’s was a time period of drastic economic and inflationary volatility; the Federal
Reserve was struggling to provide consistency in inflation to the economy, as the central
bank juggled with battling inflation and challenged Fed officials to provide effective
monetary policy, without inducing multiple recessions. Such a challenge is alien to the
modern day economy, as the current central bank regime has been, as of 2019-2020,
struggling to push inflation up to its target rate of 4% (more of this will be discussed later
in Chapter II).
Mid-1974 to 1975 would mark a “deep recession” (Mussa, 2005) in history, but the
central bank would have achieved partial success in lowering inflation. The Federal funds
rate at its highest point was at 13% in mid-1974 and had declined to 5% in mid-1975. The
decrease of the Federal funds rate was the central bank's reaction to an economy that was
in a contractionary stage; further, the decrease in the Federal funds rate was a reaction to
the decrease in other short-term rates.
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Through 1978, economic expansion began to move in an aggressive fashion as the
White House under the Carter Administration was encouraging economic growth to fight
unemployment in 1977. The administration's goal of economic expansion had been met; by
the end of 1978, real GNP had increased 6.3% and inflation was up from 6.7% at the end
of 1977 to 9% by the end of 1978. Naturally, the reaction of the FOMC was to begin to
hike Fed funds rates and they did that; in 1978 the Fed funds rate was increased 3 times,
landing at 10% by the end of the year. During this time, the FOMC formally declared the
objective of controlling inflation a higher concern than maintaining the current economic
growth rate in April of 1978.
In 1979, the U.S. economy again faced more inflation related challenges as global
pressures, specifically in energies, as oil prices began to rise once again due to conflicts in
Iran. “The energy component of the CPI showed a 37.4 percent increase during 1979,
compared with an 8.0 percent increase during 1978, and this helped raise the overall
inflation rate from 9.0 to 13.3 percent” (Mussa, 2005, pg. 91). Again, the FOMC would
continue to consider controlling inflationary pressures as its number one priority moving
forward through the year. In combination with a nervous outlook on the acceleration of
inflation, the FOMC midway through the year would come to expect economic declines, as
second quarter data exhibited a decline in economic growth, and would suggest economic
contractions to continue throughout that year. When looking at the performance of the
Federal Reserve in attempting to keep inflation at bay, it is apparent that during the 1970’s,
the Fed mishandled the use of the Federal funds rate in order to combat the issue. The Fed
was not efficient in their abilities to prevent inflation, but were only committed to
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responding to inflation; Mussa writes that “increases in the Federal funds rate often lagged
behind increases in the inflation rate, indicating fairly clearly that the Federal Reserve was
"falling behind the curve" in its actions to combat rising inflation” (Mussa, 2005, pg. 95).

2.2. The Paul Volcker Regime:
During August of 1979, Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Fed. Volcker
was familiar with the challenges and tasks of the central bank as he had been serving as
president of the Fed for four years and had been acclimated with the Nixon Administration.
Under the control of Volcker, the central bank would quickly begin to rethink its strategy
and the ways in which it could employ its tool in order to curb volatile inflation.
The Open Market Desk would change the way in which it would operate; instead of
taking directives from the FOMC in order to dictate a Federal Funds target range, it’s main
objective would be to achieve target rates of monetary growth by controlling the supply of
reserves. The FOMC would recommend a volume of reserves to banks that would allow
the economy to achieve short term monetary growth targets, and the Open Market Desk
would conduct the supply. This change marked an important point in how the central bank
would behave. By changing to a monetarist conduct of policy, the central bank signaled to
markets that it would be allowing the Fed funds rate to fluctuate in a wider range; this gave
the central bank much greater flexibility to respond to macroeconomic developments with
the Fed funds rate. For example, rather than allowing a tolerance range of the Fed funds
rate of 1% or .5%, the Fed funds rate in 1979 would range from 11.5% to 15.5%.
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The effects of the Fed were immediately evident in market data, as short term rates
grew, long term bond prices began to drop, and the Fed Funds market immediately began
to test its upper limits. By the end of 1979, the Fed had raised its range to 15.5%-20%.
Inflation wasn’t turning around either as the fourth quarter of 1979 as the annualized
inflation rate in December was 13.4%. Moving into 1980, the economy was pushed into a
recession as a result of the Feds tight monetary policy and the Carter Administration’s
interference with consumer credit. By May, the Fed funds rate had dropped down to 13%,
and in response the FOMC lowered its lower bound tolerance rate to 10.5%. The rate cuts
continued as the low range of the target rate would fall to 8.5% by June, marking a 10%
decrease in the bottom range of the tolerance rate from March-June 1980. The cuts and
declines of the Fed funds rate were expected, and were a direct result from the Fed's
actions of targeting monetary growth; since Open Market Desk was supplying more
reserves to the market, the rate in the Fed Funds market naturally declined. Due to such
extreme tightening of policy, the recession was dramatic as GNP declined by roughly 9%
(1980, Q1-Q2). Though the decline in the economy was steep, it was relatively brief for a
recession; recovery in the economy was beginning to surface in the summer and by the end
of the year the economy was showing modest gains in GNP at around 5%.
Inflation through 1980 was inconsistent, but by the end of the year it could be said
that the Federal Reserve was partially successful in curbing inflation by the end of the
year; annual inflation was down to 12.5% in December from 13.9% in January. Though
inflation was down by the end of 1980, the central bank knew that it had come at a cost.
The Federal Reserve was partial in their success to curb inflation due to political reasons as
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well. The summer of 1980 preceded the election of Ronald Reagan, the Federal Reserve
moved to a much more dovish tone. In choosing to delay aggressive policy, the Federal
Reserve was allowing itself to become distant to the outcome of the election. Once Reagan
was elected, the Fed would be free again to engage in its intended tightening of policy; the
Federal Reserve did so through 1982. Following the election the Fed funds rate had
reached 19% by December of 1980, in addition monetary aggregates were now beginning
to fall back into the mid to higher segments of their target ranges.
Moving through 1981, tight monetary policy would continue and a recession would
take place in the fourth quarter of the year; the Federal funds rate remained high
throughout 1981, ranging from 15%-20%. Despite the costs to the economy, inflation was
coming down. Much of the same costs that were paid in 1980, were similar to those
experienced in 1981, as a recession similar to the scale of 1980’s recession was looming as
late 1981 economic data was signaling economic downturn. From the Q3 to the Q4 of
1981, GNP had dropped 10.1%; from Q4 1981-Q1 1982, GNP had dropped another 4%. In
Q1 of 1982, the Central Bank was heavily focused on controlling the growth of monetary
aggregates and this seemed to be working; December of 1981 inflation was 8.92% and by
the end of March 1982 inflation was at 6.78%. In the summer, the Federal Reserve and
FOMC had begun to ease their tight policy, raising monetary aggregate targets.
Although monetary aggregates did not immediately grow, the Fed funds rate had
dropped from 14.5% in late June, to 9% by late August. By this time monetary aggregates
were beginning to grow, and would continue to grow through 1983. Despite subjecting the
economy to multiple recession, inflation was ultimately handled as average inflation in
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1983 was 3.22%, in comparison to an average rate of 13.58% in 1980; inflation would
remain low throughout Volckers tenure as Chairman of the Fed, not exceeding inflation of
4.5% through 1987 (Mussa, 2005, pg. 96-98).

2.2.1 Analysis of Volcker Regime:
In this portion of the chapter, we will examine the performance of monetary policy
under Paul Volcker. It is clear that Volcker inherited the reigns of the Federal Reserve in
an economic environment being torn apart by inflation and unemployment. Volckers
greatest achievement was being able to put an end to an era of volatile and high inflation,
regardless of the economic costs; Volcker succeeded. By changing the behavior of the
FOMC in targeting monetary aggregates in a more direct form helped Volcker achieve
such a feat, but the ways in which interest rates were manipulated is what will be more
closely analyzed in this portion of the chapter. By taking a monetarist approach, Volcker
subjected interest rates to extreme volatility in the first half of his tenure as Fed Chairman.
Much literature discusses movements in the short end of the yield curve during this era,
however for the purposes of analyzing interest rates through the interest rate theories in
Chapter I, we must analyze rates beyond the short end of the curve.

2.2.2 Unbiased Expectations Theory Though the Volcker Era:
1980-1981 was a unique period for the yield curve, as it not only inverted, but
interest rates were at historical highs; in the Fed’s tightening of monetary policy,
short-term rates rose to nearly 20%. If we were to analyze the actions of Volcker through
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the lense of the Unbiased Expectations Theory, know that the UET is not only a theory of
expected short term rates based on the long end of the yield curve, but further that the
theory is based on expected inflation; according to UET, future inflation will impact long
term rates thus providing the markets with an indication of future short term rates. In the
case of 1979, Volcker had immediately begun to aggressively fight inflation as soon as he
was announced Chairman. By switching to a monetarist approach, the Federal Reserve was
handling the Fed funds rate by not targeting it, setting a wide tolerance range. According to
UET, the market reaction to falling long term rates is a real indication that investors had
strong confidence in Volckers ability to handle inflation at this point, as UET suggests that
the market was anticipating a drop in the Fed funds rate in the future due to low inflation.
At the end of 1979 the spread between the 10-year and 2-year U.S. Treasury was -0.9%
and by March of 1980, the spread was -2.34%.
As the yield curve began to invert at a more extreme level, the Fed funds tolerance
rate was and the actual Fed funds rate were at historic levels beginning in 1980; the
tolerance range in late 1979 was set at 15.5%-20%. During the spring of 1980, the Fed was
forced by way of nonpartisanship to the ongoing election to loosen its monetary policy for
the time being, so it did. However, it was clear to markets under this theory that investors
had confidence that Volcker would be able to handle inflation and that it would decrease in
the future. Inflation under the UET is important because it is the first indicator to investors
because it signals future action by the Federal Reserve to encourage higher short term
interest rates. The significance of the UET during this time period was that the market was
indicating that Volcker would be successful, putting faith in new FOMC operations. This
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was historic in that the Federal Reserve would be targeting the monetary aggregates
relative to other concerns, and that the Fed would be comfortable in letting short time rates
skyrocket; this is why the time period of 1979-1982 is a prime example for displaying the
UET.
In order to better understand how investors were analyzing the bond markets of this
time period, we can use the UET with Federal Reserve Economic Data to run the theory.
By the end of December 1980, the 2-Year Treasury Rate was 14.08%, and the 1-Year
Treasury Rate was 14.88%; from this data we should be able to solve for the expected rate
of the 1-Year Treasury Bond in December of 1981. We can get an expected rate of the
1-Year Treasury Bond, in 1981 (1 year forward from December of 1980) by recalling the
expectations theory the equation as follows:

(1 + 0 rn )n = [(1 + 0 r1 )(1 +

1 f 1 )(1

+

2 f 1)

. . . (1 +

t+(n−1) f 1 )]

(2.1)

This equation (2.1) denotes an expected rate(s) by rolling over a series of 1-year bonds,
n-years. The left side of the equation will be:

(1 +0 r2 )2 = 1.301352045

(2.2)

Since we know the value of the current (December 1980) 1-Year Treasury rate we can
input it such that the right side of the equation now becomes:

1.301352045 = [(1.1488)(1 + 1 f 1 )]

(2.3)

1.132783554 = [(1 +

(2.4)

1 f1

1 f 1 )]

≈ 13.27%
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(2.5)

Solving for our new equation we find that

1 f1

(2.5), or our expected 1-year rate of 1981 is

roughly 13%, and the actual 1-year Treasury rate in December, 1981 ranged from 11.47%
to 14%, averaging roughly 12.7%.
I then tested the UET for the years 1978- 1983 (end of year) as these were the most
economically unstable years under Volcker. The methodology is simple; the process of
(2.1) - (2-5) is expanded for years 1978 -1983 (end of year). The 1 f 1 is found for each year
for a total of 72 observations (72 months - 6 years). We then subtract the 1 f 1 from the
actual 1-Year rate, 1 year in the future; this will give us a differential between the expected
rate result from the UET equation and the actual 1-Year rate (1 year in the future). The
differentials are then organized for frequency, by “Bins” which are ranges of 1%, so that
we are able to see how accurate the UET is in providing expected 1-Year U.S. Treasury
rates, 1 year in the future, and also so that we can observe if the UET was overestimating
or under-estimating future 1-Year U.S. Treasury rates.

34

Figure 2.2.2 - Data Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org *displays the differentials
between the expected 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1-Year in the future as given by
equation (2.1), and the actual 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1-Year in the future

In terms of the results of this test, 56.94% of the time equation
(2.1) overestimated the 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1 year in the
future, and 43.06% of the time it under-estimated.  In Table
2.2.2 (a), we can see the distribution and frequency of the
differentials. Of the 72 observations, 65.28% of the expected
1-Year U.S. Treasury rates, 1 year in the future, from the UET
equation (2.1) were accurate within a range of -3%
underestimation, to 3% overestimation of the actual 1-Year U.S.
Treasury rate, 1 year in the future.

Table 2.2.2 - Data Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org *displays the differentials between the expected 1-Year U.S.
Treasury rate, 1-Year in the future as given by equation (2.1), and the actual 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1-Year in the
future, and the frequencies of the differentials sorted by bins with ranges of 1%
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So, if investors were using UET during this time period, they would be able to
predict the future 1-Year U.S. Treasury rate, 1 year in the future, within a 6% range (-3%
to 3%), 65.28% of the time, and within a 4% range (-3% to 1%), 55.56% of the time.

2.3 The Alan Greenspan Regime & Greenspan’s Conundrum
Alan Greenspan followed Paul Volcker and served as both Federal Reserve
Chairman and the FOMC Chairman from 1987-2006, serving five terms under four
different presidents. Greenspan's tenure as Chairman can be best summarized as, like
Volcker, anti-inflationary and with a strong focus on controlling prices. Greenspan is also
known for what is “Greenspan’s Conundrum” or also known as the “Bond Yield
Conundrum” (Daniel L. Thornton, 2012, pg. 2)..
Greenspan’s Conundrum was a situation in which the long-term rates of the yield
curve were not responding to changes to target rates of the Federal funds rate in the ways
that the Federal Reserve/FOMC were anticipating as a drop in long-term rates in response
to the tightening of monetary policy is unusual.
In February 2005, Greenspan and the FOMC had previously raised the Federal
funds rate target by 1.5%, however had observed that long-term rates had fallen. From
June 2004 to February 2005, the 10-Year Treasury Rate had fallen from 4.37% to 4.17% in
response to a 1.5% increase in the Fed funds rate during the same period of time. In
February of 2005, in the Federal Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to
Congress, Greenspan had said that:
“In this environment, long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent
months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target Federal funds
rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which
suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are
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normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. The simple mathematics of
the yield curve governs the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates.
Ten-year yields, for example, can be thought of as an average of ten consecutive
one-year forward rates. A rise in the first-year forward rate, which correlates
closely with the Federal funds rate, would increase the yield on ten-year U.S.
Treasury notes even if the more-distant forward rates remain unchanged.
Historically, though, even these distant forward rates have tended to rise in
association with monetary policy tightening.”
(Greenspan February 16, 2005)
(Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate February 16, 2005).

Figure 2.5 - Effective Federal funds rate & 10-Year Constant Maturity Rate - Data Source: fred.stlouis.org

In Figure 2.5, we can see how the 10-Year Treasury rate was directly responding to
changes in the Federal funds rate, displaying what Greenspan was observing. Don H. Kim
and Jonathan H. Wright (2005) had produced an “Arbitrage-Free Three-Factor Term
Structure Model”, which would help evaluate the term-premium for long term yields such
as the 10-Year Treasury rate. Kim and Wright found that “estimates imply that if the term
premium had not changed, ten-year yields would have risen modestly over this time
period, as one would expect in an environment of monetary policy tightening” (Kim and
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Wright 2005, pg.11). Kim and Wright do not however, explicitly explain what exactly is
causing a decline in the term premium, however Daniel Thorton (2012) expresses that in
an internal memo to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Joshua Rosenberg
(Chief Risk Officer for the Federal Reserve), noted that “the decline in the term premium
from Kim and Wright’s (2005) model into (a) changes in risk, (b) risk aversion, and (c)
foreign demand” (Daniel L. Thornton, 2012, pg. 3).
In 2007, David Backus and Jonathan Wright published a report and analysis
regarding the 2004-2006 “conundrum” in which they attempt to explain the fall in the term
premium. Backus and Wright (2007) analyze the cyclical behavior of interest rates, looking
at how the relationship between the past three periods of tightening monetary policy (1986,
1994, 1999), and 10-Year Treasury rates. The relationship during these three periods was
clear and expected as the rate on 10-Year Treasuries had increased along with higher
Federal Funds target rates.
We should remember the relationship between the Unbiased Expectations Theory
and the Duration Premium Theory. The Duration Premium Theory is a modification to the
Unbiased Expectations Theory; it adds a premium which in theory increases as the term to
maturity increases due to liquidity risks, inflationary risks, price volatility risks, among
others risks which explain a higher duration premium for longer maturities. In the case of
Greenspan’s Conundrum the market was not reacting in a way in which the UET could
explain as long term rates were decreasing in response to an 150bps increase in the Federal
funds rate, however given the modification of the Duration Premium Theory, we can see
how a diminishing premium to long term Treasuries could explain the drop in forward
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rates as well as drops in long term rates. Kim and Wright note that “Over this time period
[June 29, 2004 to July 29, 2005], the ten-year zero-coupon yield fell 50 basis points, but
the associated term premium is estimated to have declined by about 80 basis points.
Accordingly, the model [The Arbitrage-Free Three-Factor Term Structure Model and the
Recent Behavior of Long-Term Yields and Distant-Horizon Forward Rates] estimates
imply that if the term premium had not changed, ten-year yields would have risen modestly
over this time period, as one would expect in an environment of monetary policy
tightening” (Kim and Wright 2005, pg 11). Kim and Wright’s findings that the 10-Year
rate would have risen due to an increase in the Federal funds rate with an unchanged term
premium, speak directly to the assumption of the Duration Premium Theory that bonds of
different maturities are not perfect substitutes due to different values of risk associated
with duration; in this case there is a diminishing premium for duration.

2.4 Ben Bernanke on the Decrease in the Term Premium
Moving into 2006, Ben Bernanke was appointed Chairman of the Fed and would
serve two terms, ending his tenure in 2014. Bernanke was a member of the Board of
Governors at the Federal Reserve as of 2004 and was able to reflect on Greenspan’s
Conundrum as he began his role as Chairman of the Fed. In a speech to the Economic Club
of New York in March 2006, Bernanke made comments consistent with the DPT findings
in 2.3. Bernanke commented on the behavior of long term yields stating

“The ten-year Treasury yield, for example, can be viewed as a weighted average of
the current one-year rate and nine one-year forward rates, with the weights depending on
the coupon yield of the security. As I will discuss, each of these forward rates can be split

39

further into (1) a portion equal to the one-year spot rate that market participants currently
expect to prevail at the corresponding date in the future, and (2) a portion that reflects
additional compensation to the bondholder for the risk of holding longer-dated
instruments. . . As I have noted, each of the forward interest rates implicit in the term
structure can be usefully decomposed into two parts: (1) the spot interest rate that market
participants currently expect to prevail at the corresponding date in the future and (2) the
additional compensation that investors require for the risk of holding longer-term
instruments, known as the term premium. With the economic outlook held constant,
changes in the net demand for long-term securities have their largest effect on the term
premium.”
(Reflections on the Yield Curve and Monetary Policy, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke Before the Economic Club of New
York, New York, New York, March 20, 2006)

Bernanke here is describing the relationship between (1), the UET, and (2), the
DPT. Additionally, Bernanke is speaking to the MST “changes in the net demand for
long-term securities have their largest effect on the term premium” (Bernanke, 2006).
Bernanke in the same speech then goes on to list four possible reasons that may explain the
decline in the term premium. First, “longer-maturity obligations may be more attractive
because of more stable inflation, better-anchored inflation expectations, and a reduction in
economic volatility more generally” (Bernanke 2006). Second, “the increased intervention
in currency markets by a number of governments, particularly in Asia” (Bernanke 2006).
Third, that “changes in the management of and accounting for pension funds are a source
of a declining term premium” (Bernanke 2006). Fourth, “as investors' demands for
long-duration securities may have increased over the past few years, the supply of such
securities seems not to have kept pace” (Bernanke 2006). In Bernanke’s first reason for the
decline in the term premium can be mostly characterized by the “Great Moderation”
(Bernanke 2004), which can be defined as a period of economic stability; stability is
thought of in terms of reduced inflation and GDP volatility due to “structural changes in
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the economy such as deregulation, improved inventory control methods, and better
risk-sharing in financial markets” (Bernanke 2006), such that the market would not be
demanding such a high premium for risk, resulting in a decreased term premium.
In the second explanation for the decline in the term premium, increased
intervention in currency markets by foreign agents, Greenspan notes that foreign agents,
specifically central banks, were deploying “a bulk” (Bernanke 2006) of their U.S. Dollar
holdings into U.S. Treasuries. This would then increase demand for long-term U.S.
Treasuries, therefore depressing yields. Bernanke also notes that in 2004, long-term yields
dropped during the same period as increased purchases of U.S. Dollars by other central
banks.
Bernanke suggests in his third reason, that changes in pension funds may be
responsible for the decline in the term premium. Due to developing reforms in the U.S. and
Europe, pension funds needed to better match the duration of their assets and liabilities.
Bernanke admits that there is “little direct evidence to date of sizable pension-fund
portfolio shifts toward long-duration bonds” (Bernanke 2006).
Lastly, the fourth explanation for the decrease in the term premium according to
Bernanke is more a general macro shift in investors preferences for maturity; Bernanke
suggests that there has been a rising demand for longer maturity bonds, however the
market has failed to provide adequate supply in order to sustain demands, depressing
yields for long-term bonds.

2.5 The Fed’s Narrative vs. Other Theories
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The narrative of the Federal Reserve on why they are not able to control long term
yields with tight monetary policy is simple: The economy is moderating and the decreasing
term premium is the result of investors signaling to markets that they no longer demand a
high duration premium for risk associated with long term securities in fixed income
markets. The Fed would be able to claim that their loss over the control of the yield curve
was due to economic moderation; an ode to the Feds successes. However, in the years
leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2008 it is clear looking back at financial and economic
trends that investors had reason to be worried about the health of the financial sector, U.S.
credit, and the economy. The rise of leverage on balance sheets, deregulation of the
financial sector, and the high volume of securitized loans, are the typical suspects, but were
only few of the many indicators of an imminent financial collapse. We know that investors
during the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008 had anticipated the crisis, and UET
would suggest that bearish investors could be responsible for Greeenspan’s Conundrum.
Although this is what UET on its own would suggest, the explanation from the Fed and its
DPT approach still remains valid as well. What we are suggesting is that these two theories
can be, in conjunction with each other, responsible for the Greenspan’s loss of control over
the long end of the yield curve. In fact, the bearish investors that remained bearish would
be push down the long end of the yield curve due to negative expectations about the health
of the economy and were anticipating a rise in short-term rates; where as the bulls of the
market were, under DPT, anticipating a prolonged period of financial market stability and
as a result were not longer demanding a duration risk premium for long-term debt anymore
due to the perceived diminishing risk associated with holding long-term bonds..
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For example, if we were to rely on the DPT and the suggestions that the value of
the duration premium is diminishing, then we should reasonably expect that the long end
of the yield curve is coming down; however DPT would still suggest a higher rate on long
term maturity securities in comparison to that of the short end of the yield curve since we
are not arguing that the term premium is only decreasing and not transforming into a
negative duration premium; that long-term bonds still have a higher risk profile than that of
a short-term bond, but that spread in risk is diminishing. This was not always the case with
the yield curve under Greenspan. For example, the diminishing value of the duration
premium under the DPT cannot solely support an in which the rates on a 3-Month bond are
higher than that of a 30-Year bond, or an extremely inverted yield curve.

Figure 2.6 - Source of Data: https://fred.stlouisfed.org
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For this case, recall DPT’s assertion regarding the duration premium, that there is a
positive relationship between risk and term to maturity; that is, the maturity of a bond
determines the inherent levels of risk associated with the bond to the holder, including
inflationary risks, liquidity risks, and interest rate volatility risks. In the highlighted portion
of figure 2.6, we can see that the rates on 3-Month U.S. Treasuries are greater than that of
the rates on 30-Year U.S. Treasuries. DPT in this case, does not provide a full explanation
as to why this may be happening; the Federal Reserve argues that the decline in the
duration risk premium is responsible, however it can only be possible that the decline in
the duration premium is contributing to the conundrum and not explaining it. If the decline
in the duration premium was solely responsible for the shape of the yield curve, then
decrease in the duration premium would render the risk for 30-Year U.S. Treasuries to be
negative; this would mean that an investor purchasing a 30-Year Treasury, which
according to DPT should have more risk associated with it than a 3-Month Treasury,
would be willing to accept less yield. This is certainly an unlikely event. However, it is
more than reasonable to suggest that a declining duration premium is not completely, but
partially, responsible for the relationship between the 3-Month and 30-Year Treasury rates
during this period. So, it is possible that the relationship between the 3-Month and the
30-Year Treasuries during this time period can be supported by the UET and DPT only in
conjunction with each other.
Both theories support the shape of the yield curve through Greenspan’s Conundrum
and there is no reason to suggest that only one theory should be responsible. However, it
additionally seems possible that there are reasons as to why the Fed would prefer to push
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for a narrative coinciding with DPT rather than UET. If the Fed were to admit UET being a
contributing theory to the conundrum, they would be validating negative market
expectations, and a future recessionary episode; this would be a problematic admittance by
the Fed.
However, we are not only suggesting that two theories are responsible for
Greenspan’s conundrum, but that there are three theories at work. Recall Bernanke’s third
and fourth explanations for the decline in the term premium and we can understand that
this explanation also supports the role of Market Segmentation Theory. Bernanke suggests
that there was a macro-trend of the fixed-income market of rising demand for long-term
securities and further that pension funds and foreign Central Banks were buying high
volumes of long-term U.S. Treasury bonds (Bernanke, 2009). MST suggests that in the
fixed income market there exists different supply and demand preferences which differ by
term to maturity, therefore resulting in sub-markets governed by term maturity each with
their own market forces. In addition to expectations under the UET which suggests a
variety to reasons leading to investor expectations of lower future short-term rates, and a
declining duration premium due to a new stability in the economy, the segmentation of the
long end of the yield curve and the short end of the yield curve provides additional support
for the decline in long term rates.
During the time period of Greenspan’s Conundrum, demand for long-term U.S.
debt was rising. Abroad, Asian countries specifically were contributing to much of the
increase in demand for long-term U.S. debt. From 2000-2007, Chinese total foreign
exchange holdings jumped from $168B to over $1.5T. China was doing this in order to
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maintain the exchange rate of the Yuan to the U.S. Dollar since China was still pegging its
currency to the U.S. Dollar. Then, China decided to begin to purchase long-term U.S.
Treasuries since they would be able to receive interest on their holdings.
From 2000-2007 Japan and China alone account for an increase in holdings of
long-term U.S. Treasuries, an increase worth over $696B. In this short span of time, this
accounts for a significant amount of long-term U.S. Treasuries, this increase is a clear
representation of an increase in demand for long-term U.S. Treasuries, and would
additionally affect the available supply of long-term U.S. Treasuries. These results of
China’s and Japan’s increase in allocation of long-term U.S. Treasuries are consistent with
Market Segmentation Theory. MST suggests that in this case, market forces of long-term
U.S. Treasuries would be impacted by foreign central banks' increase in long-term U.S.
Treasuries holdings, coupled with a restricted available supply due to the increase in U.S.
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Figure 2.7 - Source of Data: h ttps://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfhhis01.txt - * year end data. Majority of U.S.
Treasuries owned by China have maturities exceeding 10 years; although specific data is not available, it is known that
the overwhelming majority of U.S. debt held by foreign central banks was in the form of bonds (+10-year maturities)

Treasury holdings would contribute to a decrease in the yields for long-term U.S. debt. In
2004, Ben Bernanke,Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack wrote that “we find evidence
supporting the view that asset purchases in large volume by a central bank would be able
to affect the price or yield of the targeted asset” (Bernanke,Reinhart, Sack, 2004). They are
not explicitly speaking to the increase in Chinese and Japanese balance sheet holdings of
long-term U.S. Treasuries, however the actions of China and Japan and the findings of
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack, are consistent. Although, as said before, and despite the
evidence in support for MST, we do not attribute MST to being a total, but only a partial
explanation for Greenspan’s Conundrum. If we are to attribute the loss of control over long
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term rates to a combination of DPT, UET, and MST, we are able to build a more complete
explanation for Greenspan's Conundrum.

2.6 Ben Bernanke, The Financial Crisis (2008), and Credit/Quantitative
Easing
The monetary policy actions following the financial crisis of 2008 were extreme. In
September 2007, the target rate was lowered by 50bps, then lowered by another 300bps by
the spring of 2008, and then by an additional 100bps in October 2008 (Bernanke 2009). By
December, the federal funds target rate was reduced to 0 - 0.25 percent (Kohn 2009).
Bernanke had reached the lower bound of the Federal funds rate so the next action by the
Fed was to use monetary policy in order to provide short-term liquidity to markets to
support credit as “liquidity provision by the central bank reduces systemic risk by assuring
market participants that, should short-term investors begin to lose confidence, financial
institutions will be able to meet the resulting demands for cash without resorting to
potentially destabilizing fire sales of assets'' (Bernanke 2009).
In November of 2008, the FOMC had announced that the Federal Reserve would
be engaging in a program labeled Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP), in which the Fed
would purchase mortgage backed securities and agency debt to provide short term liquidity
to markets and would eventually begin to purchase long-term U.S. Treasuries (D’Amico,
English, López-Salido, Nelson, 2012). The first round of LSAPs lasted until March 2010,
which resulted in the Federal Reserve adding $175B worth of agency debt, $1.25T in MBS
products, and $300B in long-term U.S. Treasuries; the Fed would also reinvest principal
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payments from agency debt and MBS products into long-term U.S. Treasuries (see Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Large-Scale Asset Purchases, programs archive). The second
round of LSAPs would continue to add to the Fed’s balance sheet, adding $600B in
long-term U.S. Treasuries from November 2010 to June 2011 (see Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, Large-Scale Asset Purchases, programs archive).
In September 2011, the FOMC announced that they would be selling $400B in
short-term U.S. Treasuries (maturities equal to or less than 3 years) in order to continue
purchases of long-term U.S. Treasuries (maturaties equal to or greater than 6 years) (Mace
2013). The program would continue through 2012, and would be labeled “the Maturity
Extension Program, commonly known as Operation Twist, included purchases of $667
billion in Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years, offset by
sales of $634 billion in Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 3 years or less”
(see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Large-Scale Asset Purchases, programs archive).
These events are deeply reminiscent of Bernanke’s remarks in 2004 (Bernanke,
Reinhart, Sack, 2004) regarding the effects of asset purchases of central banks, when
conducted in high volumes. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack, conclude that there is evidence
to support the statement that central banking activity such as the Large-Scale Asset
Purchase program, possess the ability to change the yield, rate, and price, of the asset that
is being targeted; or, in other words, that the Fed’s efforts to provide liquidity to financial
markets will have an effect on prices. In this case, this can be seen as true. When the Fed
decided to begin to add roughly $300B, then later an additional $600B worth of long-term
U.S. securities to its balance sheet, yields on the targeted maturities fell in response. MST
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would suggest that the decrease in supply of treasuries with longer maturities due to
LSAP’s, should suppress yields. Edison Yu from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
writes that “yields on Treasury bonds of the same maturity as those purchased through QE
fell the most around QE events. For example, QE1’s purchases focused on two- to 10-year
Treasury bonds, whose yields dropped more around the time of the QE1 announcement
than yields for other maturities did. This difference indicates market segmentation and that
QE worked by lowering the supply of bonds of particular maturities” (Yu, 2016, pg. 9-10).
So we know that MST can be supported by LSAP efforts, but what about expected
movements in the short end of the curve? We can combine the findings from MST during
this time period, with UET in order to explain the changes in future short-term rates
through changes in current long-term rates. The effects of UET can be more closely linked
with forward guidance measures. Following the announcement of the LSAP in November
of 2008, expected Fed funds rate fell, due to an expectation of declines in future long-term
yields. Yu finds that “the estimated signaling effect [the announcement of LSAP’s] from
lowering investors’ expectations accounted for a significant portion of the decrease in
10-year bond rates — about 20 basis points for QE1, which was about 20 percent of the
total change in yields over the same time (the 10-year Treasury yield dropped 107 basis
points two days after the announcement of QE1)” (Yu, 2013, pg. 9). These outcomes of
both the expectations, and actual effects of LSAP’s, provide a clear picture of the
relationship between MST and UET during this period. MST would indicate to investors
that the yields on long-term U.S. Treasuries would fall due to a $300B purchase in open
market operations, which would then under UET lead investors to believe that the
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short-term rates would then fall as a result, which can be reflected in the fall of the
expected Fed funds rate. The DPT also continues to be a part of the story as the duration
premium would continue to fall, but for other reasons than what have been previously
associated with the decline in the duration premium (i.e. great moderation, market
stability). The explanation as to why the duration premium is declining in this period is
more related to that of the supply and demand story of MST, although from more of a
supply side perspective. In 2013 Bernanke delivered a speech and explained that “as the
securities purchased by the Fed become scarcer, they should become more valuable.
Consequently, their yields should fall as investors demand a smaller term premium for
holding them” (Bernanke 2013). Transitioning to the end of the credit/quantitative easing
period, we can see that all three theories can work together to explain the yield curve, and
that one theory is not sufficient to support the entire story.

2.7 Janet Yellen’s Exit of Credit/Quantitative Easing and Effective Lower
Bound

Janet Yellen’s tenure was notably short, being nominated as Chair of the Federal
Reserve from 2014-2018. Yellen became responsible for guiding the Fed funds rates out of
lower bound territory, as well as reducing the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and unloading
assets from the LSAP’s. Control over inflation and monitoring unemployment were two
important objectives for the Yellen regime, specifically maintaining a target inflation rate
of 2%. From 2011, to 2015, the annual inflation rate had dropped from 3% to 0.7%.
Inflation expectations in 2015 were held low as temporary but substantial decreases in oil
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prices and oil futures markets depressed inflation and expected inflation (Fischer, 2015). In
December of 2015, the Fed for the first time in seven years had raised the target range of
the Fed funds rate, this time by 0.25%. Also, the Fed was monitoring inflation
compensation through a variety of metrics but most notably they were monitoring Treasury
Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) against actual U.S.Treasuries. But in terms of the
term structure, the yield curve was representing a normal and upward sloping curve.

Figure 2.8 - Source of Data: h ttps://fred.stlouisfed.org

Through 2016, not much had changed in terms of the Fed’s attitude towards
interest rates, with only one 25bp increase in the Fed funds rate in December. 2017 brought
three rate hikes in March, June, and December, a total of 75bps bringing the target rate to
1.25%-1.75%. Despite these increases, we can see in Figure 2.8, the term premium
decreased 2017 and the rates for long term yields were decreasing. In 2017 the 30-Year
Treasury rate dropped from 3.02% in January, to 2.77% by December. Jerome Powell who
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at the time was a governor at the Fed, continued the decreasing term premium narrative in
order to explain the low long-term rates. In 2017 Powell comments that
“The downward trend in nominal term premiums likely reflects both lower inflation
risk and the fact that, with inflation expectations anchored, nominal bonds have become an
increasingly good hedge against market risk. That has made bonds a more attractive
investment and reduced the term premium . . . Regulations now require many financial
institutions to hold more safe, high-quality liquid assets, which likely has pushed down
term premiums further. Global factors may have put downward pressure on term premiums
because of anxiety about the foreign outlook, which may have increased demand for U.S.
assets, or because low rates abroad have depressed U.S. term premiums through a global
portfolio balance channel.”
(Jerome H. Powell, (January 07, 2017), “Low Interest Rates and the Financial System”, At the 77th
Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Chicago, Illinois)

The relative attractiveness of long-term U.S. Treasuries in comparison to other
asset classes that Powell is describing is also known as a flight to quality; an event in
which investors tolerance for risk has diminished, and as a result reposition their portfolios
with assets that are may not being providing as much yield as their previous investments,
but will provide investors with positions that carry less risk. Powell mentions that expected
inflation is stable, which provides investors with a favorable environment to engage in a
flight to quality situation. It is also noteworthy that an investor will exercise a flight to
quality with assets that match in maturity. So in this particular situation, Powell is
suggesting that investors unloaded their positions in other fixed income products, for
instance long maturity high-yield bonds, in exchange for U.S. Treasuries with similar
maturities.
The term premium was affected in a similar fashion that it had been in the case of
increased Chinese and Japanese high volume allocations of U.S. Treasuries in the early
2000’s. The only difference is that in the example of China and Japan, allocations of nearly
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$700B in a 7 year span, resulted in a market shift that was only able to affect the term
premium in a modest amount; yet the flight to quality episode that Powell describes, which
is notably smaller in volume in terms of allocations of U.S. debt by investors, is an
unlikely and incomplete explanation that can account for the decrease in the term premium
that Powell and the Fed had been observing. If institutional traders in combination with
retail investors were engaging in a flight to quality, it would need to be a dramatically large
allocation of U.S. Treasuries, similar in size to the Chinese and Japanese central bank’s
allocations, in order to result in a sizable impact on the term premium; comparing the
increase in volume of retail and institutional investment in U.S. Treasuries due to a flight
to quality to the activities of two of the largest central banks over the span of 7 years
engaging in an aggressive allocation event of U.S. Treasuries seems unlikely.
Although the impact of a flight to quality event by investors could, under the MST,
contribute to depressed rates for long-term treasuries, it cannot support a full explanation
for decreases in the rates of long-term Treasuries. Inflation during this time period had
been underwhelming initially (0.12% 2014 & 1.26% 2015), but by 2016 had risen to
2.13%, exceeding the Fed’s target by 0.13%. Inflation expectations were also exhibiting
their confidence in economic health from an inflation perspective as 5-Year expected
inflation over the next five-year period was hovering right around 2%, with a range of
1.82% - 2.22% from January 2017 to December of 2018.
The DPT is consistent with expected inflation and the decline in the term premium
during this time period. The ability of Janet Yellen to control and keep inflation around 2%
was being expressed by expectations of inflation, and could also be reflected by the
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decreases in the term premium. The decreases in the term premium could be, in addition to
the MST contributions, due to a decrease in the duration premium demanded by investors.
The demanded duration premium could have decreased during this time due to the
diminishing risks associated with the duration premium, inflation specifically. Stable
expected inflation would reflect a decrease in future duration risk associated with
long-term securities.
The UET could contribute to the decline in the term premium in addition to DPT
and MST, but would take a different approach to future expectations than the LPT. UET
suggests that expectations of future short-term rates will fall as a result of low future
inflation and is reflected by low long-term rates, whereas LPT had suggested that the
declining term premium was a reflection of less duration and inflation risk. The 30-Year
Treasury rate had fallen from 3.13% in 2018 to 3.03% by the end of the year. Under UET,
the term premium was falling due to investor expectations about future short-term rates,
and this was being reflected by a decline in long-term rates in 2018. Either way, both DPT
and LPT were supporting the same results, although use different explanations to support
the results.
However, during Yellen’s tenure, UET would not support the term structure until
2019, as short-term rates through 2018 (end of Yellen's tenure) did not decline, instead
they increased modestly. In chapter 2.8, we will see that it wasn't until Q2-Q3 2019, that
we would see short-term rates begin to fall with Fed funds target rate cuts three times in
2019 (25bp cuts August, September, October) to a final target rate of 1.5% - 1.75%.
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2.8 The Jerome Powell Regime
Jerome Powell had taken over as Chairman of the Fed in February 2018, and the
Fed became comfortable with the consistency of inflation and had consequently raised
their Fed funds targets on four occasions in 2018 (25bp increases in March, June,
September, December), resulting in a target range of 2.25% - 2.5% by the end of 2018.
(see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Open Market Operations). As a
result, short-term yields were increasing, however long-term yields were relatively flat
through September. From a DPT standpoint, the duration premium for long-term bonds
was diminishing as was the term premium. A decrease in the term premium could still be
explained by DPT through consistency in inflation expectations, and investor confidence in
the Fed’s ability to control over inflation. If investors were confident that inflation will be
stable or decreasing and other risks to markets were decreasing, then that would be
reflected in a decreased demand for risk compensation. UET during this time period
supports the decline of the term premium during this time period as long-term yields which
were being held flat relative to short-term yields, due to expectations that future short-term
rates would fall. Following the rate cuts of August and September, the term premium had
begun to increase, as spreads between 2-Year and 10-Year Treasuries rose from 0% on
August 30, to 0.34% by the end of December.
DPT would explain the decline in the term premium through 2018 by maintaining
the position that the financial and economic climate suggested less risk for long maturity
bonds, and as such would be reflected by a decreased duration premium demanded by
investors. The 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Rate would decline in a small amount
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from 2.15% in January to 2.03% in December, which would support the notion that there
was less inflation risk, and therefore a decrease in the demanded duration premium. 2019
showed similar behavior in the 5-Year, 5-Year Forward Inflation Rate, and would record a
small decline of 0.15% (January - December 2019).

Figure 2.9 - Source of Data: h ttps://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T5YIFR#0

It most certainly is possible that this could be the case, and this explanation would
be favorable for the Fed, however UET would suggest that the decline in the term premium
could be reflective of decreases in future short-term rates, due to low expected inflation.
UET during this time period supports the decline of the term premium during this time
period as long-term yields which were being held flat relative to short-term yields, due to
expectations that future short-term rates would fall. Following the rate cuts of August and
September, the term premium had begun to increase, as spreads between 2-Year and
10-Year Treasuries rose from 0% on August 30, to 0.34% by the end of December. The
yield curve in the end of 2018 through 2019 began to better support the UET as long-term
yields had held relatively steady as the term premium was still declining. Around
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April-May, the yield curve began to invert, which began to signal that future short-term
rates would decline. Additionally, inflation had dropped from 2% in April to 1.6% by June.
July marked the beginning of import tariffs that would be imposed on China, which further
drove down expectations about future inflation and enhanced the possibility of future rate
cuts. In August, the Fed had cut the Fed funds target rate by 25bps. Two more rate cuts
followed in October, and December resulting in a new target rate of 1.5% - 1.75%. Bond
markets had reacted accordingly as the rate on 3-Month Treasury bonds had dropped from
2% in August, to roughly 1.5% in December.

Conclusion
This paper has shown how the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis, the Duration
Premium Theory, and Market Segmentations Theory, provide investors with explanations
of the term structure of interest rates. It has also been shown how all of the theories can be
utilized in order to provide a more complete explanation of the yield curve. Further, the
narrative of the Federal Reserve and their explanation for the term structure of interest
rates has been analyzed and we have added to the Fed’s explanations by introducing all of
the theories in each of these analyzed periods. Although the explanations of the Fed have
been validated, the other theories (mainly UET) have been validated in explaining the term
structure of interest rates. Challenges that have been presented to each Federal Reserve
Regime have been covered, and we have analyzed how monetary policies have shaped
investor activities, and expectations. To conclude, it is favorable to investors to consider all
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three theories when analyzing the yield curve, in contrast to only one, to build a more
complete framework of the term structure of interest rates.
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